Investigation Finds That Former High-Ranking Uzbek Security Official Acquired UAE Citizenship

Por Catherine Putz — The Diplomat

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According to a OCCRP and Ozodlik investigation, Otabek Umarov, the Uzbek president’s son-in-law, obtained Emirati citizenship in 2023, while he was deputy head of the Presidential Security Service.

In April 2023, when he was serving as deputy head of the Presidential Security Service, Otabek Umarov – Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s son-in-law – reportedly acquired citizenship in the United Arab Emirates. He’s also alleged to be the owner of around $7 million worth of Dubai real estate.

Those are the central allegations of a new investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Ozodlik .

Under Uzbek military law, which governs the position Umarov held at the time, holding a second citizenship is prohibited. Since acquiring citizenship typically includes swearing an oath of allegiance, many countries bar security (and other) officials from doing so – a second passport represents possible divided loyalties and a counterintelligence risk.

As OCCRP and Ozodlik reported, “Under UAE law, foreigners can only obtain citizenship through a nomination by a royal court or senior official, and [the process] requires swearing an oath of allegiance to the Emirates.”

Umarov was shifted out of his security service role in November 2024, in the extended wake of the assassination attempt on Komil Allamjanov. 

Allamjanov, at the time of the October 2024 attempt, had recently stepped down from his role as deputy head of the presidential administration. He has since returned to government service, as an adviser to the powerful head of the presidential administration, Saida Mirziyoyeva (the president’s eldest daughter). As of January 2026 he was also appointed to a seemingly bespoke role: advisor-ambassador and representative of the presidential administration in the United States.

Umarov, meanwhile, was named first deputy chairman of Uzbekistan’s National Olympic Committee – his father-in-law, the president, is the chairman.

According to OCCRP and Ozodlik, at some point in 2025, Umarov became the owner of 13 properties in Dubai, worth around $7 million. The properties previously belonged to his younger brother, Oybek Umarov, who purchased them in 2021 and 2022, according to leaked Dubai real estate data obtained by OCCRP. 

It is not clear precisely how or when they came to be listed with Umarov’s name on the deeds, whether the properties were gifted or purchased. 

While Umarov has notably expensive tastes – for example, he’s been pictured wearing a limited edition Richard Mille watch valued at up to $1.9 million – his government position doesn’t quite explain his apparent wealth. Uzbek officials do not have to disclose their income declarations publicly.

OCCRP and Ozodlik reported, “Public commercial registries show no record of [Otabek Umarov] owning private companies during his time as deputy presidential security chief.” His brother, however, does have extensive business holdings, including in banking, cement, and metalwork. 

A high-ranking government source told The Diplomat in late 2024 that Umarov’s assets and businesses were held in the names of others, including Ulugbek Shadmanov who was implicated in an apparent attempt to manipulate the U.S. sanctions system to target Allamjonov and another Uzbek official in the months before the assassination attempt. Shadmanov was earlier named in the Pandora Papers as connected to an offshore company, though there are few details available. In December 2024 he was detained in Dubai and extradited rapidly – apparently without the proper legal process – to Uzbekistan, regardless of the fact that he held what’s known as a “ Golden Visa ” in the UAE. Despite high-powered legal representation and a campaign on his behalf, very little has been reported since about his case. 

Ultimately, the OCCRP and Ozodlik investigation raises far more questions than it answers; that’s the nature of investigations into the opaque underbelly of Uzbek politics (and those of the UAE, to boot). As I told Ozodlik , we don’t know exactly how Umarov acquired UAE citizenship, who was involved, and who knew about it. As noted above, the process to acquired UAE citizenship necessitates a nomination by a royal court or senior official. It’s nearly impossible to believe that Umarov’s role and connections were unknown at the time to the UAE’s authorities.

Then there are questions of what comes next. Uzbekistan does not officially recognize dual citizenship. Holding a second citizenship isn’t illegal per se – though it does violate laws related to Umarov’s specific position at the time. Nevertheless, “voluntarily acquiring a passport of a foreign state” is listed as possible grounds for revocation of Uzbek citizenship.

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In April 2023, when he was serving as deputy head of the Presidential Security Service, Otabek Umarov – Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s son-in-law – reportedly acquired citizenship in the United Arab Emirates. He’s also alleged to be the owner of around $7 million worth of Dubai real estate.

Those are the central allegations of a new investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Ozodlik .

Under Uzbek military law, which governs the position Umarov held at the time, holding a second citizenship is prohibited. Since acquiring citizenship typically includes swearing an oath of allegiance, many countries bar security (and other) officials from doing so – a second passport represents possible divided loyalties and a counterintelligence risk.

As OCCRP and Ozodlik reported, “Under UAE law, foreigners can only obtain citizenship through a nomination by a royal court or senior official, and [the process] requires swearing an oath of allegiance to the Emirates.”

Umarov was shifted out of his security service role in November 2024, in the extended wake of the assassination attempt on Komil Allamjanov. 

Allamjanov, at the time of the October 2024 attempt, had recently stepped down from his role as deputy head of the presidential administration. He has since returned to government service, as an adviser to the powerful head of the presidential administration, Saida Mirziyoyeva (the president’s eldest daughter). As of January 2026 he was also appointed to a seemingly bespoke role: advisor-ambassador and representative of the presidential administration in the United States.

Umarov, meanwhile, was named first deputy chairman of Uzbekistan’s National Olympic Committee – his father-in-law, the president, is the chairman.

According to OCCRP and Ozodlik, at some point in 2025, Umarov became the owner of 13 properties in Dubai, worth around $7 million. The properties previously belonged to his younger brother, Oybek Umarov, who purchased them in 2021 and 2022, according to leaked Dubai real estate data obtained by OCCRP. 

It is not clear precisely how or when they came to be listed with Umarov’s name on the deeds, whether the properties were gifted or purchased. 

While Umarov has notably expensive tastes – for example, he’s been pictured wearing a limited edition Richard Mille watch valued at up to $1.9 million – his government position doesn’t quite explain his apparent wealth. Uzbek officials do not have to disclose their income declarations publicly.

OCCRP and Ozodlik reported, “Public commercial registries show no record of [Otabek Umarov] owning private companies during his time as deputy presidential security chief.” His brother, however, does have extensive business holdings, including in banking, cement, and metalwork. 

A high-ranking government source told The Diplomat in late 2024 that Umarov’s assets and businesses were held in the names of others, including Ulugbek Shadmanov who was implicated in an apparent attempt to manipulate the U.S. sanctions system to target Allamjonov and another Uzbek official in the months before the assassination attempt. Shadmanov was earlier named in the Pandora Papers as connected to an offshore company, though there are few details available. In December 2024 he was detained in Dubai and extradited rapidly – apparently without the proper legal process – to Uzbekistan, regardless of the fact that he held what’s known as a “ Golden Visa ” in the UAE. Despite high-powered legal representation and a campaign on his behalf, very little has been reported since about his case. 

Ultimately, the OCCRP and Ozodlik investigation raises far more questions than it answers; that’s the nature of investigations into the opaque underbelly of Uzbek politics (and those of the UAE, to boot). As I told Ozodlik , we don’t know exactly how Umarov acquired UAE citizenship, who was involved, and who knew about it. As noted above, the process to acquired UAE citizenship necessitates a nomination by a royal court or senior official. It’s nearly impossible to believe that Umarov’s role and connections were unknown at the time to the UAE’s authorities.

Then there are questions of what comes next. Uzbekistan does not officially recognize dual citizenship. Holding a second citizenship isn’t illegal per se – though it does violate laws related to Umarov’s specific position at the time. Nevertheless, “voluntarily acquiring a passport of a foreign state” is listed as possible grounds for revocation of Uzbek citizenship.

Catherine Putz is managing editor of The Diplomat.

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Fonte: The Diplomat