Weapons in orbit are forcing old space laws into new struggles for power

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September 17, 2026 e-Paper

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September 17, 2026 e-Paper

Published – September 17, 2026 08:36 am IST

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On September 14, U.S. Air Force Secretary Troy Meink confirmed that the U.S. Space Force has “space control weapons” in orbit. The statement did not disclose what the weapons are, how many have been deployed, when they were placed in orbit or the circumstances in which they will be used.

Also read | U.S. ‘weapons in orbit’: what we should expect modern space war to look like 

The U.S. and other major space powers have long developed counter-space capabilities. Some are designed to protect satellites. Others can disrupt, degrade or destroy an adversary’s space systems. But why has this sparked a debate now?

‘Space control’ represents the ability to protect one’s own freedom of action while limiting an adversary’s ability to operate in space, and thus implies a strategic objective. As the U.S. economist Thomas Schelling noted in his 1966 book Arms and Influence, bargaining power is the power to hurt, and to exploit it is diplomacy — vicious diplomacy, sure, but diplomacy nonetheless.

And in orbit, a state simply possessing operational space-control capabilities can create an expectation of the use of latent threat to coerce adversaries and to shape terrestrial behavior long before an actual conflict even begins.

That objective can be pursued through various means. Electronic warfare, cybersecurity operations, proximity operations, satellite manoeuvrability, and space-domain awareness can all contribute to space control. Some are also dual-use: a single capability can support legitimate servicing or inspection activities or it can be used to interfere with another spacecraft.

If states are expanding from protecting their space assets to acquiring the ability to control the space environment around them, questions automatically arise about what the law actually permits.

The first legal question is simple: are weapons allowed in outer space?

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits states from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth. However, when the Treaty was annexed to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI), the published English text omitted the second ‘such’ in the final part of Article IV, which referred to “station weapons in outer space”. The authentic Treaty text reads “station such weapons in outer space”.

Without the second ‘such’, the provision could be read as prohibiting weapons in outer space generally. But with it, the prohibition is restricted to nuclear weapons and the other weapons of mass destruction identified earlier in the sentence. And the Treaty text that entered into force adopted the narrower formulation.

That said, Article III of the Treaty requires space activities to comply with international law, including the United Nations Charter. Article IX also requires states to conduct activities with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states and addresses harmful interference with the activities of other states parties.

For these reasons, the legal question encompasses both the assets placed in orbit and their respective states’ intentions with them. That is, a spacecraft that can approach another satellite may be used to service or to disable it. The circumstances and the consequences also matter.

India’s dependence on space is growing. The space domain now supports defence communications, navigation, intelligence and surveillance, as well as weather services, disaster management and civilian connectivity. India’s expanding commercial space sector adds another layer to this dependence. A contested orbital environment could therefore affect much more than military satellites alone.

That said, India also has an opportunity to shape the rules around an increasingly contested orbital environment.

That is where the emerging BRICS Space Council is relevant. The recent ‘New Delhi Declaration’ records progress on its terms of reference while also reaffirming the support of the BRICS bloc for the peaceful use and long-term sustainability of outer space and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In When Right Makes Might (2018), the political scientist Stacie Goddard wrote, “legitimation creates a rhetorical frame … giving its actions meaning and allowing a great power to interpret material facts—military buildups, invasions, economic competition as either threatening or benign”.

That is, by proactively shaping norms around harmful interference and proximity operations through forums like BRICS, India can ensure that defensive counter-space measures are recognised internationally as legitimate acts of self-defense rather than as a form of destabilising escalation.

India’s focus must thus be on helping determine who defines the limits of space control. The proposed BRICS Space Council could become one avenue through which India and other Global South space actors begin to do so.

Shrawani Shagun is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS), New Delhi.

Published – September 17, 2026 08:36 am IST

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Fonte: The Hindu – International