Japan’s Failed Centrist Experiment

Por Jio Kamata — The Diplomat

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The CDP-Komeito alliance is breaking apart. But a return to resistance-oriented politics may not be the answer for Japan’s opposition.

The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), once thought to pose a significant threat to Takaichi Sanae’s hold on power, came to an unremarkable end. After nearly seven months of negotiations among the CRA and its sister parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and Komeito – both of which had dissolved in the lower house but continued to exist in the upper chamber – the three parties concluded that a complete merger would not proceed . As a result, the CRA is set to split into two groups, with former Komeito members returning to their former party and former CDP-affiliated members launching a new party. One member of the latter group will remain in the CRA to oversee its dissolution.

While the process of ending the CRA is already complicated enough, what makes it even more difficult for voters to grasp is that former CRA members will form a parliamentary group in the lower house. In other words, while the two parties have decided that they cannot be part of the same party, they still believe that they need to act as one, at least within the lower house.

The main cause of the breakdown in negotiations has been said to be the CDP’s reluctance. While Komeito was willing to join the CDP, which essentially shared its policy positions, the CDP ultimately could not reconcile its policies with those of Komeito. Komeito is more right-wing than the CDP’s positions on national security and nuclear energy. 

Moreover, with local elections approaching next spring and the CRA having performed poorly at the February 2026 polls, local branches of the CDP have grown concerned that joining the party could put them at a disadvantage electorally. With the CDP having the largest number of local legislators among the opposition parties, second only to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), it had much to lose by alienating its local candidates and organizations.

However, confidence may also have factored into the CDP’s calculations. While the CRA had consistently struggled in the polls, the CDP has significantly outperformed the alliance in some polls. According to an August poll by TV Asahi , the CDP recorded 4.7 percent support, compared with just 1.8 percent for the CRA. Similarly, an NHK poll put support for the CDP at 2.8 percent, compared with 1.7 percent for the CRA. These figures may have reinforced the CDP’s belief that it could perform better on its own than as part of a broader alliance.

Nevertheless, the CDP’s record in national elections tells a different story. Since its reorganization in 2020, the CDP has either lost seats or significantly underperformed other opposition parties in terms of changes in its parliamentary strength. In both the 2021 lower house election and the 2022 upper house election, the CDP ended up with fewer seats than it had before the election. 

Although the party surged from 98 to 148 seats in the 2024 lower house election, the increase came overwhelmingly from single-member districts, where the CDP benefited from a favorable electoral environment, including the political-funds scandal involving LDP candidates. By contrast, its performance in the proportional ballot barely improved from the previous election: its proportional vote total increased only marginally , despite higher voter turnout. 

In the 2025 upper house election, the CDP’s parliamentary representation remained essentially flat , while it fell to third place among the opposition parties in the proportional vote, behind the Democratic Party for the People and Sanseito.

Before the 2026 lower house election, the CDP’s alignment with, and eventual incorporation into, the CRA alongside Komeito was intended to reverse the party’s declining appeal among younger voters. Younger Japanese were thought to favor tangible policy outcomes – from lower costs of living to robust national security measures – over simply opposing the governing party. However, the electoral strategy failed.

This does not mean that so-called “ resistance opposition ,” a label that some pundits have come to associate with the CDP brand, lacks sufficient appeal to give the party staying power. Especially among older generations, opposing the LDP on normative issues such as the interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution and a zero-tolerance stance on nuclear energy – both core issues on which the CDP has refused to compromise – remains essential to their political orientation. However, as past election results make manifestly clear, those who could be described as “resistance liberals” do not constitute a majority, while parties that have performed well electorally in recent elections are gaining ground among younger voters. 

With a weakening yen driving up prices across the board and a deteriorating security environment not only across the region but around the globe leading to abandonment of strict application of pacifism, resistance-oriented politics is increasingly seen as an unrealistic approach to governing a country. The CDP may be playing it safe by relying on tactics that succeeded in a different era, but by going it alone, it risks doing a disservice to its constituents and diminishing the political standing it might otherwise have strengthened through its alignment with the CRA.

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The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), once thought to pose a significant threat to Takaichi Sanae’s hold on power, came to an unremarkable end. After nearly seven months of negotiations among the CRA and its sister parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and Komeito – both of which had dissolved in the lower house but continued to exist in the upper chamber – the three parties concluded that a complete merger would not proceed . As a result, the CRA is set to split into two groups, with former Komeito members returning to their former party and former CDP-affiliated members launching a new party. One member of the latter group will remain in the CRA to oversee its dissolution.

While the process of ending the CRA is already complicated enough, what makes it even more difficult for voters to grasp is that former CRA members will form a parliamentary group in the lower house. In other words, while the two parties have decided that they cannot be part of the same party, they still believe that they need to act as one, at least within the lower house.

The main cause of the breakdown in negotiations has been said to be the CDP’s reluctance. While Komeito was willing to join the CDP, which essentially shared its policy positions, the CDP ultimately could not reconcile its policies with those of Komeito. Komeito is more right-wing than the CDP’s positions on national security and nuclear energy. 

Moreover, with local elections approaching next spring and the CRA having performed poorly at the February 2026 polls, local branches of the CDP have grown concerned that joining the party could put them at a disadvantage electorally. With the CDP having the largest number of local legislators among the opposition parties, second only to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), it had much to lose by alienating its local candidates and organizations.

However, confidence may also have factored into the CDP’s calculations. While the CRA had consistently struggled in the polls, the CDP has significantly outperformed the alliance in some polls. According to an August poll by TV Asahi , the CDP recorded 4.7 percent support, compared with just 1.8 percent for the CRA. Similarly, an NHK poll put support for the CDP at 2.8 percent, compared with 1.7 percent for the CRA. These figures may have reinforced the CDP’s belief that it could perform better on its own than as part of a broader alliance.

Nevertheless, the CDP’s record in national elections tells a different story. Since its reorganization in 2020, the CDP has either lost seats or significantly underperformed other opposition parties in terms of changes in its parliamentary strength. In both the 2021 lower house election and the 2022 upper house election, the CDP ended up with fewer seats than it had before the election. 

Although the party surged from 98 to 148 seats in the 2024 lower house election, the increase came overwhelmingly from single-member districts, where the CDP benefited from a favorable electoral environment, including the political-funds scandal involving LDP candidates. By contrast, its performance in the proportional ballot barely improved from the previous election: its proportional vote total increased only marginally , despite higher voter turnout. 

In the 2025 upper house election, the CDP’s parliamentary representation remained essentially flat , while it fell to third place among the opposition parties in the proportional vote, behind the Democratic Party for the People and Sanseito.

Before the 2026 lower house election, the CDP’s alignment with, and eventual incorporation into, the CRA alongside Komeito was intended to reverse the party’s declining appeal among younger voters. Younger Japanese were thought to favor tangible policy outcomes – from lower costs of living to robust national security measures – over simply opposing the governing party. However, the electoral strategy failed.

This does not mean that so-called “ resistance opposition ,” a label that some pundits have come to associate with the CDP brand, lacks sufficient appeal to give the party staying power. Especially among older generations, opposing the LDP on normative issues such as the interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution and a zero-tolerance stance on nuclear energy – both core issues on which the CDP has refused to compromise – remains essential to their political orientation. However, as past election results make manifestly clear, those who could be described as “resistance liberals” do not constitute a majority, while parties that have performed well electorally in recent elections are gaining ground among younger voters. 

With a weakening yen driving up prices across the board and a deteriorating security environment not only across the region but around the globe leading to abandonment of strict application of pacifism, resistance-oriented politics is increasingly seen as an unrealistic approach to governing a country. The CDP may be playing it safe by relying on tactics that succeeded in a different era, but by going it alone, it risks doing a disservice to its constituents and diminishing the political standing it might otherwise have strengthened through its alignment with the CRA.

Jio Kamata is a freelance writer and regular contributor to The Diplomat.

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Fonte: The Diplomat