China Is Moving Toward a New Form of Coercion at Sea

Por Allen Zhang — The Diplomat

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China is pushing patrols into new waters near Taiwan, regularizing its presence, and deploying research vessels that can conduct military reconnaissance.

Since Beijing announced special maritime operations on June 6, its forces have grown more assertive – pushing patrols into new waters, rotating formations to regularize presence, and deploying research vessels that can conduct military reconnaissance. This all points to a new form of coercion taking shape. 

On July 4, the Global Times – a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party – declared that China’s maritime patrols had entered “a new phase,” defined by a move towards “a more systematic, institutionalized, and long-term framework” and away from “isolated military exercises or patrols.” 

Recent deployments bear this out. Between June 6 and June 10, China’s Ministry of Transport carried out its first special operation in waters east of Taiwan, halting commercial vessels and requesting information on their points of origin and destination.

While China has announced mandatory inspections during past exercises, it has never successfully enforced them. This time was different. Chinese Coast Guard ships conducted inspections en masse through radio communications with all transiting commercial vessels. Even foreign commercial vessels – including three vessels from Singapore, Benin, and Liberia – reported receiving radio messages from Chinese authorities to comply with requests.

According to Chinese state news agency Xinhua , across those four days, Chinese maritime authorities inspected 198 passing vessels, and even “rectified violations involving three ships.” The sheer quantity of reported inspections, followed by a public announcement of the results, demonstrates China’s ability to govern vessel traffic in Taiwan’s waters. Beijing uses that as grounds to assert jurisdiction over the island and to push the narrative that cross-strait dynamics are China’s internal affairs.

These operations may be testing grounds for an eventual quarantine, where China selectively permits commercial vessels to enter or leave, exerting immense pressure on Taiwan’s supply lines. If that is the case, the series of multi-day patrols serve two functions.

First, they test how foreign nations respond to maritime traffic controls. Knowing which nations elect to respond, and to what degree, gives Beijing some sense of what to expect. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France, for instance, issued a joint statement expressing alarm over the maritime activities. Australia raised concerns directly with Chinese officials. How forceful Beijing judges the pushback to be will affect the intensity of operations. In the event of an actual quarantine, though, responses are likely to be more pronounced. 

Second, they normalize China’s vessel inspections, shortening the leap to a quarantine. In July, China’s Coast Guard began rotating its formations to regularize its law-enforcement presence. The Global Times has noted the advantages of maintaining a “constant presence” because “a normalized presence itself exerts pressure.” The longer Beijing can keep ships on station, the more quickly it can impose a quarantine.

The location of operations is unusual as well. Until June, China appeared to prioritize the Taiwan Strait, where conditions are most favorable for launching an amphibious invasion. Oddly enough, the maritime operations have been concentrated in waters opposite the strait, to the east of Taiwan. The island’s eastern coast has long been regarded as a low-priority zone as steep mountains make military landings difficult.

But choosing to operate in the east is not random. The move effectively shrinks the space that Taiwan can operate in, aligning with China’s broader boa-constrictor strategy to sever the island from international support. More telling is that these patrols, China claims, were initiated as a response to talks between Japan and the Philippines to delimit maritime boundaries east of Taiwan. Beijing hopes to deter strategic cooperation between two U.S. allies, one located north and the other to the south of the island, that may each play critical roles during a conflict over Taiwan.

A final novelty of the recent operations is the sharp increase in Chinese research vessels operating in waters around Taiwan. While Beijing maintains that these ships only conduct marine scientific research, their missions appear far less benign. Publicly available tracking data shows that these vessels could be systematically mapping the undersea terrain, presaging planning for naval operations. Since June 6, at least seven research vessels have been suspected of conducting research with military applications.

Taken together, these signs indicate that a more intrusive form of coercion is taking form. Regional nations would be unwise to dismiss this as more of the same.

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Since Beijing announced special maritime operations on June 6, its forces have grown more assertive – pushing patrols into new waters, rotating formations to regularize presence, and deploying research vessels that can conduct military reconnaissance. This all points to a new form of coercion taking shape. 

On July 4, the Global Times – a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party – declared that China’s maritime patrols had entered “a new phase,” defined by a move towards “a more systematic, institutionalized, and long-term framework” and away from “isolated military exercises or patrols.” 

Recent deployments bear this out. Between June 6 and June 10, China’s Ministry of Transport carried out its first special operation in waters east of Taiwan, halting commercial vessels and requesting information on their points of origin and destination.

While China has announced mandatory inspections during past exercises, it has never successfully enforced them. This time was different. Chinese Coast Guard ships conducted inspections en masse through radio communications with all transiting commercial vessels. Even foreign commercial vessels – including three vessels from Singapore, Benin, and Liberia – reported receiving radio messages from Chinese authorities to comply with requests.

According to Chinese state news agency Xinhua , across those four days, Chinese maritime authorities inspected 198 passing vessels, and even “rectified violations involving three ships.” The sheer quantity of reported inspections, followed by a public announcement of the results, demonstrates China’s ability to govern vessel traffic in Taiwan’s waters. Beijing uses that as grounds to assert jurisdiction over the island and to push the narrative that cross-strait dynamics are China’s internal affairs.

These operations may be testing grounds for an eventual quarantine, where China selectively permits commercial vessels to enter or leave, exerting immense pressure on Taiwan’s supply lines. If that is the case, the series of multi-day patrols serve two functions.

First, they test how foreign nations respond to maritime traffic controls. Knowing which nations elect to respond, and to what degree, gives Beijing some sense of what to expect. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France, for instance, issued a joint statement expressing alarm over the maritime activities. Australia raised concerns directly with Chinese officials. How forceful Beijing judges the pushback to be will affect the intensity of operations. In the event of an actual quarantine, though, responses are likely to be more pronounced. 

Second, they normalize China’s vessel inspections, shortening the leap to a quarantine. In July, China’s Coast Guard began rotating its formations to regularize its law-enforcement presence. The Global Times has noted the advantages of maintaining a “constant presence” because “a normalized presence itself exerts pressure.” The longer Beijing can keep ships on station, the more quickly it can impose a quarantine.

The location of operations is unusual as well. Until June, China appeared to prioritize the Taiwan Strait, where conditions are most favorable for launching an amphibious invasion. Oddly enough, the maritime operations have been concentrated in waters opposite the strait, to the east of Taiwan. The island’s eastern coast has long been regarded as a low-priority zone as steep mountains make military landings difficult.

But choosing to operate in the east is not random. The move effectively shrinks the space that Taiwan can operate in, aligning with China’s broader boa-constrictor strategy to sever the island from international support. More telling is that these patrols, China claims, were initiated as a response to talks between Japan and the Philippines to delimit maritime boundaries east of Taiwan. Beijing hopes to deter strategic cooperation between two U.S. allies, one located north and the other to the south of the island, that may each play critical roles during a conflict over Taiwan.

A final novelty of the recent operations is the sharp increase in Chinese research vessels operating in waters around Taiwan. While Beijing maintains that these ships only conduct marine scientific research, their missions appear far less benign. Publicly available tracking data shows that these vessels could be systematically mapping the undersea terrain, presaging planning for naval operations. Since June 6, at least seven research vessels have been suspected of conducting research with military applications.

Taken together, these signs indicate that a more intrusive form of coercion is taking form. Regional nations would be unwise to dismiss this as more of the same.

Allen Zhang is a researcher in the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, where he contributes to the Center’s research on Taiwan and China policy.

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Fonte: The Diplomat