BRICS Declaration: India’s Great U-turn on Iran

Por Asif Ullah Khan — The Diplomat

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The declaration endorsed most of Iran’s main diplomatic concerns without speaking a single word against its drone and missile attacks on its neighboring Gulf states.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian being honored at a meeting with a group of Indian religious leaders, intellectuals, and businesspeople in New Delhi, India, on Sept. 11, 2026, the eve of the 18th BRICS Summit.

Before the BRICS summit in New Delhi, political analysts had warned that India would have to do a very difficult tightrope walk given the presence of China, Russia, and Iran. It was a foregone conclusion that they would use this platform for U.S. bashing. With India’s current tug-of-war with the Donald Trump administration, the honchos at South Block (India’s foreign ministry headquarters) used nuanced vocabulary and calibrated the final declaration in such a way that the United States was not named, but the declaration explicitly called for an end to unilateral economic sanctions, protectionist trade measures, and arbitrary tariffs.

The surprising outcome of the summit is this: what is being hailed as a triumph of strategic autonomy saw the dilution of India’s foreign policy since the advent of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The BRICS summit was billed as the Modi show, but Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stole that thunder if one looks at the details of the Delhi declaration. The declaration endorsed most of Iran’s main diplomatic concerns without speaking a single word against its drone and missile attacks on its neighboring Gulf states. There was likewise no mention of Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, who have in recent times increased attacks on Saudi Arabia and held sea trade across the Red Sea hostage. The presence of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan and his meeting with the Iranian president did not yield any tangible result, which India could have hailed as a diplomatic success of its foreign policy. Instead, India urged “maximum restraint” in West Asia.

The other clear shift in Indian foreign policy was seen in the absence of any mention of Israel’s “right to defend itself.” On the contrary, Israel was explicitly named and told to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory. The declaration demanded unrestricted humanitarian aid to Gaza and opposed the forced displacement of Palestinians. The wording of the declaration may ruffle feathers in Israel when it says: “We reject any unilateral measures that seek to alter the legal and historical status of occupied Jerusalem. We urge full respect for the sanctity of all religious sites and holy places in the city and for the rights of all to access and to observe their religious rites without hindrance.”

The declaration referred to proceedings brought by South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

The declaration voiced deep concern over “deliberate attacks” on civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities protected by U.N. atomic energy safeguards. The Associated Press described the provision as an indirect criticism of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

The remarkable turnaround in Indian foreign policy can be gauged from the fact that in many places Israel’s name is explicitly mentioned, whereas when it comes to Iran’s aggression, the language of diplomatic ambiguity is used.

Remember Modi’s language when he visited Israel in February 2026, where he was honored with a newly created Knesset medal? While addressing Indian-origin Jews, he said that “Israel is their fatherland and India their motherland,” highlighting their emotional bond to both. Within 48 hours of Modi’s visit, Israel and the U.S. launched aerial attacks on Iran.

What followed saw India dumping centuries-old ties with Iran into the Persian Gulf. India did not condemn the killing of more than 150 schoolgirls; Modi did not condemn or personally offer condolences for the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and did not attend Khamenei’s funeral. All this was as India went increasingly Western, strengthening ties with Western and West Asian partners, especially Israel and the UAE. Despite all this, Iran kept diplomatic silence. But the entire scenario changed with Iran’s military success against the onslaught of the superior firepower of the U.S. and Israel.

So, does the declaration reflect an Iranian military victory or India’s realization that it had backed the wrong horse? The answer can be both.

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Before the BRICS summit in New Delhi, political analysts had warned that India would have to do a very difficult tightrope walk given the presence of China, Russia, and Iran. It was a foregone conclusion that they would use this platform for U.S. bashing. With India’s current tug-of-war with the Donald Trump administration, the honchos at South Block (India’s foreign ministry headquarters) used nuanced vocabulary and calibrated the final declaration in such a way that the United States was not named, but the declaration explicitly called for an end to unilateral economic sanctions, protectionist trade measures, and arbitrary tariffs.

The surprising outcome of the summit is this: what is being hailed as a triumph of strategic autonomy saw the dilution of India’s foreign policy since the advent of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The BRICS summit was billed as the Modi show, but Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stole that thunder if one looks at the details of the Delhi declaration. The declaration endorsed most of Iran’s main diplomatic concerns without speaking a single word against its drone and missile attacks on its neighboring Gulf states. There was likewise no mention of Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, who have in recent times increased attacks on Saudi Arabia and held sea trade across the Red Sea hostage. The presence of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan and his meeting with the Iranian president did not yield any tangible result, which India could have hailed as a diplomatic success of its foreign policy. Instead, India urged “maximum restraint” in West Asia.

The other clear shift in Indian foreign policy was seen in the absence of any mention of Israel’s “right to defend itself.” On the contrary, Israel was explicitly named and told to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory. The declaration demanded unrestricted humanitarian aid to Gaza and opposed the forced displacement of Palestinians. The wording of the declaration may ruffle feathers in Israel when it says: “We reject any unilateral measures that seek to alter the legal and historical status of occupied Jerusalem. We urge full respect for the sanctity of all religious sites and holy places in the city and for the rights of all to access and to observe their religious rites without hindrance.”

The declaration referred to proceedings brought by South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

The declaration voiced deep concern over “deliberate attacks” on civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities protected by U.N. atomic energy safeguards. The Associated Press described the provision as an indirect criticism of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

The remarkable turnaround in Indian foreign policy can be gauged from the fact that in many places Israel’s name is explicitly mentioned, whereas when it comes to Iran’s aggression, the language of diplomatic ambiguity is used.

Remember Modi’s language when he visited Israel in February 2026, where he was honored with a newly created Knesset medal? While addressing Indian-origin Jews, he said that “Israel is their fatherland and India their motherland,” highlighting their emotional bond to both. Within 48 hours of Modi’s visit, Israel and the U.S. launched aerial attacks on Iran.

What followed saw India dumping centuries-old ties with Iran into the Persian Gulf. India did not condemn the killing of more than 150 schoolgirls; Modi did not condemn or personally offer condolences for the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and did not attend Khamenei’s funeral. All this was as India went increasingly Western, strengthening ties with Western and West Asian partners, especially Israel and the UAE. Despite all this, Iran kept diplomatic silence. But the entire scenario changed with Iran’s military success against the onslaught of the superior firepower of the U.S. and Israel.

So, does the declaration reflect an Iranian military victory or India’s realization that it had backed the wrong horse? The answer can be both.

Asif Ullah Khan is a veteran journalist who has held senior editorial positions at The Times of India, Khaleej Times, The Hindustan Times, and The Brunei Times. He currently writes for The Diplomat, The Wire, The India Legal, The ASEAN Post, and other international publications.

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Fonte: The Diplomat