‘A Tower of Jelly’

Por Sribala Subramanian — The Diplomat

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The United Nations, U Thant, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

U.N. Secretary-General U Thant (right) confers with Jose Rolz-Bennett, U.N. deputy chef de cabinet, and other officials during a session of the U.N. Security Council in New York, Sep. 3, 1963.

“What is the use of a fire brigade which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first smoke and flames appear?” asked Abba Eban, addressing an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly soon after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War had ended.

In a fiery speech, the foreign minister of Israel lashed out at the U.N. for pulling peacekeeping troops out of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.  The “disastrously swift” withdrawal, Eban argued, had endangered the “national survival” of the Jewish state.

Israel’s Six-Day War was nevertheless a spectacular military success. The Israel Defense Forces neutralized three Arab armies (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) within a week and occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

In his latest book, “Peacemaker,” historian Thant Myint-U offers new insights on the U.N.’s role in the events leading up to the six-day conflict.

The book’s title refers to U Thant, the author’s grandfather. As U.N. secretary-general, the Burmese diplomat was the chief “firefighter” charged with deploying peacekeeping troops to conflict zones.  The “most successful peacekeeping operation” was UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), which had maintained a fragile peace along the border between Egypt and Israel for more than a decade.

When the Egyptian military sent the U.N. an informal communication in mid-May requesting a withdrawal of peacekeeping troops, Thant faced a dilemma. Denying Cairo’s request would violate Egypt’s sovereignty, but removing the forces might jeopardize the U.N.’s conflict-prevention mission.  The Secretary-General acquiesced after receiving an official letter from the foreign minister.  However, as Thant was negotiating UNEF’s exit, Israeli jets strafed a convoy in the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, killing three soldiers.

Thant faced “a deluge of criticism” for the troop withdrawal and for his inability to counter “Egyptian bluster.”  Former British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home called the Secretary-General’s visit to Egypt in late May a “dreadful mistake.” When Thant landed in Cairo, President Gamal Abdel Nasser was already in war mode, having closed the Straits of Tiran, a vital shipping route for Israel.  A Western diplomat quoted in The Wall Street Journal called the U.N. chief “a tower of jelly.”

Gideon Rafael, the Israeli ambassador to the U.N., defended his friend in the Hebrew-language newspaper Maariv, saying, “U Thant is not responsible for the situation in the Middle East.”

In a chapter titled “Gaza and the Sinai,” the author highlights an intriguing detail on how misinformation played a role in the lead-up to the war.  Nasser’s actions were influenced by false intelligence reports relayed by Moscow and Damascus about a buildup of Israeli forces along the Syrian border.  Arab leaders did little to verify the claims, even as U.N. observers cast doubt on the report’s veracity.

“The Syrians could have looked from the Golan Heights (which they controlled) down into Israel and seen that there were no troop concentrations, as alleged, but they were happy to pass on to Cairo the misinformation as it confirmed their longstanding claim of an imminent threat,” commented the author.

In 1959, U Thant was the frontrunner for the top U.N. job as the only candidate acceptable to both Israel and the Arab states. Golda Meir, then Israel’s foreign minister, indicated that Thant was Tel Aviv’s sole choice for the position. However, the first Asian secretary-general of the U.N. did not have a “feel for the passions surrounding the conflict” once war broke out in the Middle East.

His low-key style worked when both parties were motivated to defuse a confrontation. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the U.N. Secretary-General helped create “an opening for diplomacy.”  U Thant “injected himself into the very heart of the simmering crisis,” the author wrote, giving the Soviet Union and the U.S. a face-saving option to back away from a nuclear showdown.  In 1965, the veteran diplomat was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation efforts.

The goodwill earned during his first term had evaporated by the late 1960s. In certain circles, Thant was considered “Israel’s nemesis,” and his relationship with Washington deteriorated. The secretary-general was a critic of the Vietnam War and spoke out against the Johnson Administration’s bombing campaign in Southeast Asia.

“Thant retired, then virtually disappeared,” wrote his grandson, almost as if he was “airbrushed from history.”

The former Secretary-General spent his final years in a colonial-style house outside New York City with “a meditation room, a glass-enclosed annex with images of the Buddha and views of the Westchester countryside.”

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“What is the use of a fire brigade which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first smoke and flames appear?” asked Abba Eban, addressing an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly soon after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War had ended.

In a fiery speech, the foreign minister of Israel lashed out at the U.N. for pulling peacekeeping troops out of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.  The “disastrously swift” withdrawal, Eban argued, had endangered the “national survival” of the Jewish state.

Israel’s Six-Day War was nevertheless a spectacular military success. The Israel Defense Forces neutralized three Arab armies (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) within a week and occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

In his latest book, “Peacemaker,” historian Thant Myint-U offers new insights on the U.N.’s role in the events leading up to the six-day conflict.

The book’s title refers to U Thant, the author’s grandfather. As U.N. secretary-general, the Burmese diplomat was the chief “firefighter” charged with deploying peacekeeping troops to conflict zones.  The “most successful peacekeeping operation” was UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), which had maintained a fragile peace along the border between Egypt and Israel for more than a decade.

When the Egyptian military sent the U.N. an informal communication in mid-May requesting a withdrawal of peacekeeping troops, Thant faced a dilemma. Denying Cairo’s request would violate Egypt’s sovereignty, but removing the forces might jeopardize the U.N.’s conflict-prevention mission.  The Secretary-General acquiesced after receiving an official letter from the foreign minister.  However, as Thant was negotiating UNEF’s exit, Israeli jets strafed a convoy in the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, killing three soldiers.

Thant faced “a deluge of criticism” for the troop withdrawal and for his inability to counter “Egyptian bluster.”  Former British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home called the Secretary-General’s visit to Egypt in late May a “dreadful mistake.” When Thant landed in Cairo, President Gamal Abdel Nasser was already in war mode, having closed the Straits of Tiran, a vital shipping route for Israel.  A Western diplomat quoted in The Wall Street Journal called the U.N. chief “a tower of jelly.”

Gideon Rafael, the Israeli ambassador to the U.N., defended his friend in the Hebrew-language newspaper Maariv, saying, “U Thant is not responsible for the situation in the Middle East.”

In a chapter titled “Gaza and the Sinai,” the author highlights an intriguing detail on how misinformation played a role in the lead-up to the war.  Nasser’s actions were influenced by false intelligence reports relayed by Moscow and Damascus about a buildup of Israeli forces along the Syrian border.  Arab leaders did little to verify the claims, even as U.N. observers cast doubt on the report’s veracity.

“The Syrians could have looked from the Golan Heights (which they controlled) down into Israel and seen that there were no troop concentrations, as alleged, but they were happy to pass on to Cairo the misinformation as it confirmed their longstanding claim of an imminent threat,” commented the author.

In 1959, U Thant was the frontrunner for the top U.N. job as the only candidate acceptable to both Israel and the Arab states. Golda Meir, then Israel’s foreign minister, indicated that Thant was Tel Aviv’s sole choice for the position. However, the first Asian secretary-general of the U.N. did not have a “feel for the passions surrounding the conflict” once war broke out in the Middle East.

His low-key style worked when both parties were motivated to defuse a confrontation. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the U.N. Secretary-General helped create “an opening for diplomacy.”  U Thant “injected himself into the very heart of the simmering crisis,” the author wrote, giving the Soviet Union and the U.S. a face-saving option to back away from a nuclear showdown.  In 1965, the veteran diplomat was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation efforts.

The goodwill earned during his first term had evaporated by the late 1960s. In certain circles, Thant was considered “Israel’s nemesis,” and his relationship with Washington deteriorated. The secretary-general was a critic of the Vietnam War and spoke out against the Johnson Administration’s bombing campaign in Southeast Asia.

“Thant retired, then virtually disappeared,” wrote his grandson, almost as if he was “airbrushed from history.”

The former Secretary-General spent his final years in a colonial-style house outside New York City with “a meditation room, a glass-enclosed annex with images of the Buddha and views of the Westchester countryside.”

Sribala Subramanian is a New York-based columnist for The Diplomat.

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Fonte: The Diplomat